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This is heresy, of course, coming from a lawyer, a law professor, a person who makes his living teaching and writing about federal courts. It probably is not politically correct. But I think I am
right, and I think thoughtful people who step back from the process
of government by injunction would agree.
This should be a matter of concern no matter what your politics. The power over state institutions first claimed in the good fight
to end de jure segregation is not limited to any area of public policy.
It can be pressed into the service of a conservative agenda just as
easily, with citations to the applications discussed in this book as
precedents.29
Let me end with a quotation from a book by Gerald N. Rosenberg that Professor Kemerer and Judge Justice ought to read.
Aptly titled, The Hollow Hope - Can Courts Bring About Social
Change?, the concluding paragraph reads:
American courts are not all-powerful institutions. They were
designed with severe limitations and placed in a political system
of divided powers. To ask them to produce significant social reform is to forget their history and ignore their constraints. It is
to cloud our vision with a naive and romantic belief in the triumph of rights over politics. And while romance and even naivete have their charms, they are not best exhibited in
courtrooms. 3o

THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? By Gerald N. Rosenberg. I Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press. 1991. Pp. 425. Cloth,
$29.95.
Samuel Krislov2
The Hollow Hope is an exciting and challenging volume which
contests contemporary liberal over-valuation of courts as instruments of social change. There is a danger that it will be mistaken
for a trendy tract, but it is a far more serious venture, a book that
not imagine how true community can be achieved on the local, state and national levels.
However, I hope my pessimism is just that.
29. See note 24.
30. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope- Can Courts Bring About Social Change?
343 (U. of Chi. Press, 1991).
I. Assistant Professor of Political Science and Instructor in Law, University of Chicago. Member, D.C. Bar.
2. Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota.
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demands intellectual attention and regard. At the same time, I do
have some serious reservations. Rosenberg's answers by and large
seem right, but the question he asks is badly flawed, which colors
the whole effort. Additionally, the marshalling of evidence is erratic and even obtuse. It is a mark of the seriousness and scope of
Rosenberg's effort that it rises above these evident faults to join the
list of major works on implementation.
The volume is organized around two models of Supreme Court
effectiveness: the "dynamic court model" and the "constrained
court" model. The first is a broadly painted, command, almost
King Canute notion. The "constrained court" model notes conditions for success-the need for political allies, the presence of elements of luke-warm opposition to change that can be persuaded to
accept a court decision, etc. Underlying social trends should also be
supportive of the court's efforts. The question Rosenberg poses is
essentially which of the two models most closely approximates the
Supreme Court's achievements and failures.
Directly confronting the key and most impressive Supreme
Court efforts at reform--desegregation, legalization of abortion,
criminal justice, women's equality and reapportionment-Rosenberg concludes that given the constraints and the conditions, the
constrained court view is the most accurate. Furthermore, he argues, U.S. courts can almost never be effective producers of significant social reform. Judge Posner tells us in the blurbs that it will
"cause many lawyers to revise their view of the relation between law
and society."
Except for the extreme nature of the ultimate conclusions, even
moderately informed students of the judicial process would certainly expect vindication of the "constrained court" model. Indeed,
Rosenberg has some problems finding advocates of the "dynamic
court;" among them he lists Joel Handler, who was one of the first
scholars who helped to alert us (in the heady 1970s, not the more
conservative 1990s) that Court power was not unbounded.
It is not merely that the "dynamic court" is a straw-man. By
concentrating on what is essentially a non-question the focus is not
precise enough to permit the answer Rosenberg finally reaches. Indeed, since in at least four instances-women's rights and abortion
and reapportionment and environment-he finds the "constrained
view" too unsubtle to capture what was accomplished, it is not clear
how the cumulative conclusion of ineffectiveness was reached.
What is clear is that more sensitive answers would have been
reached had the question been posed as one exploring the conditions of success. Admittedly the book would have been less bold,

1992]

BOOK REVIEWS

369

less intellectually challenging, and attracted less attention had it
been so structured.
Wrestling with Rosenberg's evidence is half the fun of the
book. He has taken on the toughest cases, and the tour de force in
denying court efficacy in Brown earns some sort of medal for intellectual audacity.
Chapter 4, which denies that Brown had an impact on the
moral sensibility of the country, is as fascinating as it is unconvincing. Rosenberg makes this odd case by quite accurately noting the
slowdown in desegregation that had occurred prior to the Powell
Amendment and by reminding us of the linkage of successful integration to federal school funding. It is incontestible that this was
the key to substantial compliance in the deep South. But there is no
discussion of the immediate impact of Brown in desegregating not
merely the border states, but also south-like enclaves in northern
states like Indiana and Kansas-and most important symbolically-the District of Columbia. Nor does he acknowledge that the
Court's effectiveness continued to be felt in both ongoing federal
court decisions and in such decisions as Virginia's own Supreme
Court rulings which de-legitimized that state's massive resistance.
This reflects a basic problem with his test of "social reform."
There is no measure of effectiveness advanced other than that it be
nationwide and concern more than one agency; there is also implicit
definition via a list of social reforms of our time. But apparently no
partial successes count. In a number of instances, ostensible goals
quoted in the cases are discounted. For example, Rosenberg argues
that Roe implies that hospitals had a legal obligation to provide
abortions; therefore, the development of abortion clinics was a
symptom offailure. Perhaps the Justices intended to bind hospitals,
but nothing he cites in the cases or my own reading allows me to
reach his plane of understanding of their goals.
The difficulty with this ali-or-nothing approach is basic, and
painfully evident in the public administration literature on implementation and even in his own comments on other institutions.
Courts are not less efficient or in any way distinctly different from
other institutions. How often does Congress, the President, Solidarity or a Leninist cadre single-handedly effect "social reform"? In
how many instances is a policy realized precisely as the progenitors
envisioned it? Would not someone studying congressional impact
note the need for presidential, bureaucratic, or local assistance?
Would not they note many instances where institutions succeeded
only because of the coming of the "least dangerous branch" to the
rescue of the "powerful" President or Congress?
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The news that courts are bounded should come as no surprise,
but for those who need that message this is a strong dose. Judging
by the naivete of many of the witnesses at Senate confirmation hearings, sales to that audience alone would make the book a mild bestseller.
His conclusion that court actions do not mobilize support is in
part built on questionable evidence. Rosenberg explains away the
growth of support when time-series analysis suggests the court has
had an impact, but stops whenever an analysis is negative or inconclusive. Even less justifiably, he ignores evidence he stumbles upon
and uses dubious measures. Thus, he mentions the emergence of
the Southern Education Reporting Service (but not its companion
Race Relations Law Reporter), but it does not occur to him that
such new media resources, such as the post-Roe emergence of MS,
represent a better test of enhanced public attention than the totality
of articles listed in the Readers' Guide or the percentage of columns
in the New York Times Index devoted to the topic. Those curious
and insensitive measures are used throughout the volume, but are
barely justified and for the first time on page 289. He cites public
opinion polls indicating no growth in support and, though noting
others that come to different conclusions, does not provide sufficient
data to overcome the suspicion that his data are selective.
On the other hand, the proposition that a Supreme Court decision can provoke opposition is amply supported by his data. Thus
he seriously advances the argument that interest groups must assess
the costs and benefits of concentrating efforts in the judicial arena.
He argues that in many instances litigating groups should sharply
reassess their strategies and opt for political over litigation goals.
Surely he is correct about this, especially in the light of the growing
conservativism of the courts. He provides evidence of groups beggaring themselves through litigation, thereby handicapping political
advancement of their cause. Still, he provides no evidence on relative costs of political over legal mobilization. He does not attempt
to explain why legal efforts do not maximize the efforts of groups
with limited resources, as they would superficially seem to do. His
argument should give groups pause and lead them to recalculate
costs and benefits more carefully. But those groups would be as
oblivious to reality as he claims they have been in the past if they
fail to factor in a probability that many political victories also must
be re-fought in the legal arena.

